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1. Introduction and policy context 
Stern (2007) argued that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions give rise to “the greatest market 
failure the world has ever seen”. Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries around the 
world have announced indicative plans towards meeting the goal of net-zero emissions by the 
second half of the century. The European Union “Energy Roadmap 2050” aims to reduce 
carbon emissions by 80-95% by 2050 (relative to 1990 levels) and it has enacted a 40% 
reduction target for 2030, with the electricity sector decarbonizing earlier and more strongly 
than other sectors. The pricing of carbon emissions is the primary economic instrument to 
address the market failure associated with the (unpriced) external effects of climate damages.1 
Today, an increasing number of jurisdictions are implementing carbon pricing as a 
cornerstone of climate policy, at the national and sub-national levels (World Bank, 2017).   
The EU has taken a global leadership role in carbon pricing, beginning with the 
introduction of its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2005. The EU ETS has, however, so 
far failed to deliver the carbon price signal that is widely seen as necessary to incentivize the 
low-carbon transition. Its carbon price has mostly fluctuated within a band of €5–10/tCO2 
since the early 2010s, well below estimates both of the social cost of carbon (SCC) and of 
“target-consistent” carbon prices. Moreover, as there is virtually no forward-trading liquidity 
beyond a three-year horizon, longer-run carbon prices remain a “missing market” problem. 
Reforms to the EU ETS have been complicated by its political economy, notably achieving 
unanimity across EU Member States. The Market Stability Reserve (MSR), due to begin 
operation in 2019, increases complexity and may still not ensure a sufficiently strong carbon 
price signal.2 In short, policy failure sits alongside market failure. 
Against this backdrop, the idea of a carbon price floor (CPF) is gaining prominence in 
the policy debate. Since April 2013, electricity generation in Great Britain has been subject to 
a CPF “to support and provide certainty for low-carbon investment” (House of Commons, 
2018). It is structured as a “top up” to the EU ETS, with a Carbon Price Support for 2018-19 
of £18/tCO2. In October 2017, the new Dutch government announced a similar plan to 
introduce a national CPF. By contrast, President Macron of France has recently advocated an 
EU-wide CPF. This policy debate sits alongside the proximate objective of closing (unabated) 
coal-fired power generation, which has emerged in several European countries. 
 In this paper, we analyse the desirability of both of these CPFs. Given its central role 
for early decarbonization and recent policy attention, our analysis focuses on the electricity 
sector; in doing so, we sidestep issues of international competitiveness that arise for industries 
with significant non-EU trade. We take a political-economy approach that incorporates both 
market failures and policy failures in current EU climate policy.3  
                                                 
1 The basic economic argument for a market-based policy, such as a cap-and-trade scheme or a carbon 
tax, is that it delivers current emissions reduction at least cost to society by inducing the marginal cost 
of abatement to be equalized across regulated entities. It thus exploits the gains from trade between 
entities that can cheaply cut emissions and others. 
2 Following agreement on an EU ETS reform package in November 2017, the EU carbon price has 
risen to around €15/tCO2 (as of May 2018). We discuss these reforms in greater detail in Section 2. 
3 While our focus is on the EU, our analysis also offers insight to other jurisdictions seeking to 
implement well-functioning carbon markets to deliver on climate targets. Many of our arguments also 
apply to the electricity industry outside Europe. 
 3 
 Our main arguments, which we discuss below in more detail, are as follows. First, 
there is a good economic case for the introduction of price-based element into the quantity-led 
EU ETS, thus making it a “hybrid” instrument. A CPF is an attractive practical way to 
introduce such a hybrid—which is more efficient than a pure ETS or a carbon tax alone. 
Second, an EU-wide CPF can help fill the “missing market” gap of longer-term carbon 
prices and bring forward low-carbon investment by guaranteeing a minimum return to 
emissions reductions. This CPF a “low regret” policy: it directly addresses the risk of a “too 
low” carbon price in the absence of stronger EU ETS reform—and it can reassure investors 
whether or not other reforms gain pace. 
Third, a well-designed national CPF can play a similar role but comes with greater 
intra-EU trade distortions. Member States seeking to stake out climate leadership by adopting 
stringent domestic emissions targets may nonetheless find a national CPF attractive because it 
is easier to implement than an EU CPF. To enhance its durability, such a national CPF may 
need to be accompanied by an emissions performance standard (EPS). We also discuss the 
potential for a policy dynamic leading to a regional CPF beginning in North-West Europe. 
We suggest that a power sector CPF should be designed as a carbon levy to “top up” 
the EUA price to €25–30/tCO2, rising at 3–5% annually above the rate of inflation, at least 
until 2030. This would yield significant coal-to-gas switching, is more practical than relying 
on contested estimates of the SCC and in line with target-consistent carbon prices. We also 
argue that the new MSR, which is expected to begin cancelling surplus EUAs from 2023, 
enhances the medium-term value of such a CPF in terms of delivering climate benefits. 
 This paper contributes to the academic literature in four principal ways. First, we 
discuss the rationale for and design of a carbon price floor in a world characterized by 
multiple market failures; by contrast, most prior research focuses solely on the narrow case of 
a single market failure (in form of the climate externality). Second, and related, we combine 
standard economics with analysis of the underlying political economy of carbon pricing, 
including the possibility of policy failure (notably in the design of the EU ETS). Third, we 
update earlier literature in light of recent policy developments in EU carbon pricing; most 
existing academic contributions on a carbon price floor date back to the early 2010s or before. 
Fourth, we focus specifically on the power sector.4 
Finally, we must acknowledge that our analysis is necessarily based on simplifying 
assumptions. We analyze a CPF as a “sub-global” climate policy carried out by the EU (or 
parts of it), without addressing global coordination with jurisdictions outside the EU. Thereby 
we implicitly work on the premise that significant (unilateral) climate action by the EU is 
itself desirable, given that this is in line with stated European climate-policy commitments. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses recent EU ETS reforms and 
reviews international experience with carbon price floors (and ceilings). Section 3 presents the 
case for a hybrid ETS design and our political-economy analysis of an EU and national CPF. 
Section 4 discusses broader interactions between a CPF and other climate-related policies. 
Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Key earlier policy papers on CPFs (and price ceilings) include Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), Burtraw, 
Palmer and Kahn (2010), and Wood and Jotzo (2011); we further discuss the literature in the first part 
of Section 3. The recent report by the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (2017) provides a 
comprehensive discussion of carbon pricing but does not analyze the use of CPFs. 
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2. EU ETS reform and international policy experience with carbon price floors 
In this section, we summarize the challenges of EU ETS reform, then describe in detail the 
British carbon price floor (CPF) and its impacts, and finally present an overview of broader 
international policy experience towards CPFs and related measures. 
 
2.1. EU ETS reform  
Securing the unanimous agreement of 28 countries to change a system that, via its low carbon 
price, clearly benefits some coal-intensive electricity systems has proven difficult because 
such countries have an effective veto over potential reforms. Faced with low EUA prices, the 
EU has engaged in a series of efforts to reform the EU ETS, leading to multiple iterations 
involving the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament. The 
Council set out principles for ETS reform in October 2014, followed by the Commission 
offering a proposed Directive in July 2015. The Parliament and Council laid out their 
respective positions in February 2017, which led to six rounds of trilogue during 2017. 
 The main debates have been over the rate at which the total volume of emissions will 
be reduced (the so-called linear reduction factor, LRF), the number of allowances set aside in 
a market stability reserve (MSR), a new mechanism to ‘limit the validity of allowances in the 
MSR’ from 2023 onward, and the need for regular review (European Council, 2017).  
Agreement was finally reached between the Council and Parliament in November 2017 and 
ratified by the Parliament in January 2018. Since these announcements, the EUA price has 
risen from around €6/tCO2 during much of 2017 to around €15/tCO2 (as of May 2018). A 
major focus of these reforms has been to deal with the accumulation of billions of EUAs; this 
stood at 2 billion after Phase 3 and rose to 2.1 billion in 2013, before falling back slightly to 
1.7 billion by the end of 2016.  
 The MSR, originally agreed in 2015, was finally established in January 2018, and 
begins operations from January 2019. As long as the EUA surplus remains above 833 million, 
24% of the surplus will be removed each year between 2019 and 2023 and placed into the 
reserve, before dropping back to 12% per year until 2030. Moreover, from 2023, if the MSR 
volume exceeds the EUA volume auctioned in the previous year, this excess will be 
‘invalidated’ or removed from the MSR. This cancellation mechanism is expected to remove 
a large number of EUAs, with estimates of ranging between 1.7–2.4 GtCO2 over the course of 
Phase 4 (Perino and Willner, 2017; Thomson Reuters, 2017). 
 While the recent EU ETS reforms, and specifically the prospect of cancelling surplus 
EUAs in the MSR, are likely an improvement over its prior design, concerns remain. First, the 
MSR as it is currently conceived will have no long-run effect on the emissions cap beyond 
Phase 4. Second, by linking medium-term EUA supply to market conditions in a highly non-
linear and time-varying fashion, the MSR rules are opaque and overly complex.5 Third, large 
uncertainty around the future EUA price remains, notably the risk of it being “too low” to 
deliver sufficient low-carbon investment. Indeed, analyst estimates of future EUA prices vary 
                                                 
5 Perino (2018) writes: “… the rules should be simple and stable and their impacts predictable such 
that both market participants and regulators can understand them readily and respond accordingly. 
Such mechanisms do exist — but the new rules for Phase 4 are not among them.” 
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widely, with a range from €10/tCO2 to €36/tCO2 by the end of 2030 and an average 2025 
forecast of €20.75/tCO2 (see Carbon Pulse, 12 April 2018). Low future EUA prices are 
consistent with high rates of discount, which reflect enduring uncertainty and lack of 
credibility of the ETS (Schopp and Neuhoff, 2013). 
 The literature to date has similarly been sceptical about the MSR approach. Salant 
(2016) argues against such ex post interventions in ETS design. Perino and Willner (2016) do 
not find clear evidence that the MSR will provide sufficient incentives to invest in low-carbon 
technologies where “projects with long lead and life times might be negatively affected”; the 
simulation results of Perino and Willner (2017) suggest that the MSR has only a very limited 
impact on EUA prices up to 2037, even under an increased allowance intake. The only formal 
impact assessment of the MSR dates back to 2015 (EC, 2015), and does not incorporate 
central features of the stronger-than-expected 2017 agreement on MSR design. 
 
2.2. The case of the British carbon price floor  
Britain paved the way in demonstrating the potential of a CPF to help address the failures of 
the EU ETS in the power sector. The idea of a national CPF first emerged in the UK’s 
Coalition Agreement following the 2010 election.6 After a public consultation, the CPF was 
introduced in the 2011 Budget (HM Treasury, 2011a) to come into effect on 1 April 2013. 
One reason underlying the UK’s CPF was the binding obligation imposed by the Climate 
Change Act 2008, requiring Government to demonstrate progress in decarbonising the 
economy. The GB electricity sector, in which a fuel switch from coal to gas is 
straightforward, presented an immediate way of delivering that requirement.7 
 The CPF was intended “to support and provide certainty for low carbon investment” 
(HM Treasury, 2010) and increase to £30/tCO2 in 2020 and £70/tCO2 in 2030 (at 2012 
prices), driving £30–40 billion in new investment or the equivalent of 7.5–9.5 GW of new 
capacity (HoC Library, 2018). To achieve these levels, a GB-specific “Carbon Price Support” 
(CPS) is applied on top of the EUA price set in the EU ETS market. Initially, at least, the CPF 
rose: after the first year, it doubled from roughly £9/tCO2 to just over £18/tCO2.  
In the 2014 Budget, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the GB 
CPS would be capped at the rate in effect at that time of £18/tCO2 over the period 2016-17 
through 2019-20 as an addition to the EUA price. In the 2016 Budget, this was extended up to 
2021 (HMRC, 2017). The justification was that “EU ETS carbon prices are now substantially 
lower than was expected when the CPF was introduced. If kept in place, the current CPF 
trajectory would cause a large and increasing gap between the carbon price faced by UK 
energy users and those faced abroad” (HMRC, 2014). As of May 2018, the total carbon price 
arising from the EU ETS plus the GB CPS was around €33/tCO2. 
Figure 1 shows the dramatic impact of the GB CPF on the generation fuel mix, with a 
rapid decline in the coal share from 41% in 2013 to less than 8% in 2017. Prior to 2013, coal 
                                                 
6 The Conservative Party had included reference to a floor price in its election manifesto as part of a 
commitment to replace the Climate Change Levy, which had been introduced in 2001 as a levy on all 
non-domestic energy users including nuclear power (Johnson and Levell, 2010). 
7 The CPF does not currently apply to Northern Ireland, as the Irish Republic would not impose a 
corresponding CPF (both are part of the Single Electricity Market on the island of Ireland). 
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was cheaper than gas: the clean spark spread (wholesale price minus generation cost of a 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), including carbon costs) was low and often negative, 
while the corresponding dark spread for coal was positive. After 2013, however, the coal 
spread fell and became negative in most hours after 2015, so that natural gas has gained share 
from coal (which is now only run in peak hours). At the same time, the rapid growth of 
renewables has been displacing other generation, including coal and gas plant, to an 
increasing extent. Finally, net imports to Britain have risen, recently notably via 
interconnectors with the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland. 
 
Figure 1. Fuel mix in UK electricity generation, 1998Q1–2017Q3 
Source: Energy Trends, December 2017, Table 5.1 (excludes pumped storage) 
 
It is likely that the CPF has raised the wholesale price of electricity. Much, though not 
all of the time, coal-fired generation is the marginal fuel; with its emissions rate of 0.9 tonnes 
CO2/MWh and a CPS of £18/tCO2, this would further increase the wholesale price by 
£16.2/MWh. By contrast, natural gas at 0.45 tonnes CO2/MWh would raise prices by 
£8.1/MWh.8 Some indication of the carbon intensity of marginal (price-setting) generation 
comes from analysis of the marginal carbon abated by wind power (Thomson et al., 2017). In 
a period of low coal prices (during which gas is at the margin) the marginal displacement 
factor fell from 0.6 tCO2/MWh in 2009 to 0.48 tCO2/MWh in 2014, while the marginal 
emissions factor from increased demand fell from 0.66 tCO2/MWh in 2009 to 0.50 
                                                 
8 These calculations assume 100% pass-through from changes in marginal cost to changes in the 
wholesale electricity price. This is consistent with empirical evidence, for example, on pass-through in 
the EU ETS (e.g., Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen, 2006; Fabra and Reguant, 2014). 
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tCO2/MWh in 2014 (close to that of gas). Since this period, coal is more often marginal and 
this will have likely increased these marginal intensities.9 
At the time of its introduction, criticism of the GB-only CPF came from both left-
leaning and environmental groups on the one hand and consumer groups and Conservatives 
on the other. Environmentalists raised concerns that at an EU-level, the national CPF would 
not cut overall reductions but would simply raise prices in GB and thereby further depress the 
EUA price (Maxwell, 2011). Relatedly, at the European level, national interventions such as 
the GB CPF were seen by some as undermining the EU ETS (Bausch et al., 2017). These 
concerns are related to the “waterbed effect”: unilateral action that takes place within an 
individual EU ETS country or sector reduces only domestic emissions—but does not reduce 
EU-wide emissions (as these are fixed by the ETS cap).  
On the other side, the UK acting alone was seen as harming UK competitiveness and 
rising consumer bills (Grimwood, 2017). To overcome competitiveness concerns, the 
Government set up a scheme to partially compensate British energy-intensive industries for 
the cost of the EU ETS and CPF. By contrast, several electric utilities and NGOs, led by SSE, 
advocated strongly in support of the CPF as a mechanism to encourage low-carbon 
investment and lobbied for these price signals to be extended (Sandbag et al., 2017). 
 
2.3. International policy experience with carbon price floors (and ceilings) 
We begin by discussing policy initiatives for a CPF in key European countries, and then turn 
to international experience beyond Europe. To date a CPF has been implemented using three 
different mechanisms (see Wood and Jotzo, 2011). First, an auction reserve price creates a 
minimum price below which a government withholds a number of allowances from sale.10 
Unsold permits may be set aside for future use or retired, either immediately or at a later date. 
A reserve price does not set an absolute floor because the market price can temporarily drop 
below it; nonetheless arbitrage between the daily market and future auctions should prevent 
prices from falling far below the floor.11 Second, a “top up” carbon price is designed either as 
a tax that makes up the difference between the CPF level and the ETS allowance price or as a 
(possibly periodically re-set) fixed price which is added to it (as in GB). Third, under a system 
of permit buybacks, the market operator commits to buying back permits at the floor price, 
thereby reducing the volume available in the daily market (Hepburn, 2006).  
 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch Coalition talks during 2017 led to a CPF emerging as a central plank of the new 
(so-called Rutte III) government policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 49% by 2030. 
                                                 
9 There does not appear to be a single ex post econometric analysis in the literature of the performance 
of a CPF—even though Britain’s CPF has been in place for over 5 years. 
10 In cap-and-trade systems, the market price of an allowance is determined in daily trading among 
market participants; in addition, there are periodic auctions in which a government sells larger 
allowance allocations at auction-determined price. In the EU ETS, auctioning is the dominant 
allocation mechanism for the electricity sector. 
11 The use of a reserve price is common in auction design across many domains and as such does not 
contradict “market principles”. Auction theory shows that setting a reserve price is often optimal for a 
seller wishing to maximize auction revenue. Auction practice reveals that reserve prices are widely 
used, e.g., in the sale of real estate, works of art, and auctions of companies. See Klemperer (2004). 
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A previous “coal tax” had driven out older coal plants though an exemption had left in place 
newer plants with efficiency above 38% (Marshall, 2015). The new CPF has been designed to 
encourage the retirement of the five remaining Dutch coal plants. The floor price would apply 
to the power sector and rise from €18/tCO2 in 2020 to €43/tCO2 in 2030, generating revenues 
of €630 million (VVD et al, 2017). The Dutch policy is expected to be a top-up tax added to 
the price realised in the EU ETS. The Coalition Agreement expects to save 12 Mt CO2 by 
2030 by shutting down coal-fired stations, a further 2 Mt CO2 through carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) at waste generation facilities producing electricity, and 18 Mt CO2 from 
industry CCS. It is still unclear, however, to what extent the CPF will be relied upon to drive 
this investment and facilitate the coal phase-out—or whether the Dutch Government will 
enact additional measures to support the transition. 
 
France 
In April 2016, pointing to the low EUA price, the French Government under Francois 
Hollande supported a domestic carbon price floor of roughly €30/t in the power sector; this 
was aimed largely at pushing coal out of the fuel mix and taking a leadership role within the 
EU (Fjellheim et al., 2016). Segolène Royal, the Environment and Energy Minister, tried to 
extend a CPF across the EU by reaching out to Germany in the hope of creating momentum 
for action (de Beaupuy and Amiel, 2016). Broader reaction to the French proposal was mixed: 
the European Commission’s Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete argued in favour of 
maintaining the existing ETS structure while, at least in principle, Germany expressed a 
willingness to consider the possibility of introducing a CPF (Georgio, 2016). The CPF was 
due to be adopted by the French Parliament in November 2016, with a start date of January 
2017, but resistance from firms with gas-fired generation led to the measure first being 
restricted to coal. Then, Uniper (formerly E.ON) threatened to shut down its two remaining 
coal-fired plants. The French Government decided to postpone a unilateral CPF, citing state 
aid concerns and impacts on jobs (Felix et al, 2016). Nevertheless, in late 2017, President 
Macron called an EU-wide carbon price of at least €25–30/tCO2 essential to drive investment 
in energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies (Felix, 2017).12   
 
Germany  
The issue of a CPF has risen up the German policy agenda (Egli and Lecuyer, 2017) and was 
a key topic in the 2017 Federal election. The Green Party was supportive while the Free 
Democrats (FDP) wanted to expand the EU ETS by sector but were opposed to a national or 
regional CPF (Rueter and Russell, 2017). During the campaign, the two largest parties, 
Chancellor Merkel’s governing Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) 
remained equivocal with regard to a CPF and coal more generally (Argus, 2017; Timperley, 
2017). In the end, agreement was reached to establish a special commission and a plan “for 
the gradual reduction and phase-out of coal-fired power production, including an end date” 
but without a specific mechanism to accomplish the phase-out. The CDU and SPD also 
agreed to intensify cooperation with France on setting a CO2 price where the “leading 
                                                 
12 Similarly, the Nordic Council’s 2017 strategic review of energy cooperation highlighted the benefits 
of a carbon price floor (Kirk, 2017). 
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principle” would be “strengthening the EU ETS” (Amelang et al, 2018). However, as 
evidence of rising support for a CPF, in May 2018, the SPD’s Grundwertekommission or 
‘Basic Values Commission’ wrote to President Macron to support the introduction of 
minimum CO2 prices in the EU ETS in a “coalition of the willing and the responsible”.13 
 
California & Western Climate Initiative (WCI) 
The WCI was developed in 2007 by four western US states and expanded in 2008 to include 
two additional US states and four Canadian provinces. In 2011, as California and Quebec 
moved ahead with their cap-and-trade systems, the other US states withdrew. Ontario 
remained and eventually created its own cap-and-trade system, which began operating as of 
January 2017 (although the main opposition party has threatened to replace it with a carbon 
tax). California sets an auction reserve price in its ETS, introduced at $10/tCO2 in 2012 and 
rising at 5% per year (on top of adjusting for inflation). In 2017, the California Supreme Court 
rejected a suit from the Chamber of Commerce that claimed that the cap-and-trade system 
with a CPF effectively imposed an illegal tax on business (Fehrenbacher, 2017). The 
Californian ETS price has generally stayed above the reserve price except for a period in the 
first half of 2016. The other members of the linked system, Quebec and Ontario, have similar 
arrangements. The WCI ETS is notable in that it covers 85% of GHG emissions.   
 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
RGGI covers power sector emissions from Northeast and Mid-Atlantic US states. Its auction 
reserve price was set at $2.3/tCO2 in 2014, rising at 2.5% annually to roughly keep up with 
inflation. Without it, the carbon price would have fallen to near zero when emissions dropped 
below the cap following the recession and decline in natural gas prices (Aldy and Stavins, 
2012). In late 2017, RGGI created an “Emissions Containment Reserve” (ECR) which sets 
aside 10% of the allowances to be auctioned; these will be subject to a floor price of $6/tCO2 
beginning in 2021, with the price rising by 7% per year thereafter (Watson, 2017).14 Any ECR 
allowances not auctioned will be deleted. The ECR is supplemented by a “Cost Containment 
Reserve” (CCR) set at $13/tCO2 from 2021, also rising by 7% per year, thus creating a price 
corridor of $6-13/tCO2 from 2021, rising at 7%.   
 
Canada 
Canada’s two most populous provinces – Ontario and Quebec – already participate in the 
WCI, whereas the next two largest provinces, British Columbia and Alberta, have instituted 
carbon taxes rather than an ETS. By contrast, other provinces, notably Saskatchewan, have 
steadfastly opposed carbon pricing. In October 2016, the Federal Government put forward a 
“Pan-Canadian Approach to Pricing Carbon Pollution” (Government of Canada, 2016) to 
ensure that every province (and major emitters therein) would be subject to a minimum 
benchmark carbon price. Driven in part by concerns over competitiveness, this benchmark 
allows each province to independently develop their own climate policy while ensuring that a 
                                                 
13 See the ‘Response to President Macron’ of the SPD’s Grundwertekommission, at: 
https://grundwertekommission.spd.de/fileadmin/gwk/Workshop_Wirtschaft_Finanzen/Antw 
ort_an_MacronV_GWK_01.pdf (in German) 
14 Two smaller states in RGGI, New Hampshire and Maine, will not implement an ECR.   
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federal carbon pricing backstop system operate in any province or territory that does not have 
a carbon pricing system (meeting the benchmark) in place by 2018 (Parry and Mylonas, 
2017). The backstop mechanism is made up of two elements: (i) an output-based pricing 
system for industrial facilities that emit above a certain threshold and (ii) a carbon levy 
applied to fossil fuels. The levy starts at C$10/tCO2 (€6.43) in 2018 and rises by C$10 per 
year to reach C$50/tCO2 (€32.17) in 2022 (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2018). 
From 1 January 2019, any province or territory without a system in place that meets the 
federal backstop price will be supplemented as necessary.    
 
United States 
During the Obama Administration, various proposals offered in the US Congress included a 
carbon price floor (and ceiling). The American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-
Markey Bill), passed by the House of Representatives in 2009 but never taken up by the 
Senate, set a reserve price for permit auctions to start at $10/tCO2 (increasing each year by 5% 
above inflation). This would provide a floor on the carbon price as long as enough permits are 
auctioned (rather than given out for free or more cheaply available via international offset 
system). The American Power Act (Kerry-Lieberman Bill) would have set a reserve price at 
$12/tCO2 (increasing at 3% above inflation). The perceived need for a price floor or reserve 
was in part driven by lessons drawn from the EU ETS experience and the need to ensure some 
degree of price stability to encourage investment (Handley, 2009). Although there are no 
immediate prospects for action on climate change in the US, any future efforts will likely 
draw on past legislative efforts. 
 
Australia 
During 2012 to 2014, permit prices under the Gillard government were fixed at A$23/tCO2e 
(€14.71), creating a de facto price instrument (Jotzo, 2012). Nevertheless, the fixed price 
did little to incentivise low-carbon investment in a highly politicized debate over climate 
change. Opposition Leader Tony Abbott threatened to overturn the “carbon tax” as Prime 
Minister (Teeter and Sandberg, 2016); in 2014, he repealed the carbon permit-tax system 
as his first act on assuming office. Previously, Australia was expected to remove its price 
floor in order to link up to the EU ETS (Carbon Market Watch, 2015).   
 
New Zealand 
New Zealand is one of few jurisdictions to have enacted a ‘fixed price option’, effectively a 
price ceiling, at NZ$25/tCO2 (€14.91). Faced with low and declining carbon prices, the 
government over 2015-16 held a consultation, and one of the key questions was whether to 
institute a CPF: “With the current design of the NZ ETS, implementing a price floor would be 
challenging and expensive for the Government. The simplest way to establish a price floor 
would be for the Government to have a standing offer to buy NZUs at the floor price” (New 
Zealand Government, 2015). A wide range of views emerged, with 25% support for a price 
floor, 20% for a ceiling, 30% for a price corridor—while 25% were opposed to any 
intervention in the carbon market (New Zealand Government, 2016). In the end, as a 
relatively small economy, the main focus was on compatibility with other potential systems; 
the government decided against a price floor and to adjust its price ceiling.   
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Beijing pilot ETS 
In the Beijing pilot ETS, there is a form of carbon price corridor: the Development and 
Reform Commission can auction extra allowances if the average price exceeds CNY 150 
(EUR 20.30) for ten consecutive days and buy back allowances if the price is below CNY 20 
(EUR 2.70) (ICAP, 2018).  
 
 In sum, international experience shows that a CPF can serve as a practical element of 
ETS design, while retaining the appeal of a market-based abatement mechanism. This 
practical experience did not exist when the EU ETS was originally designed in the 2000s. 
CPFs that apply to an entire ETS have been designed in various ways, via an auction reserve 
price (WCI, RGGI) or as a top-up payment (Canada) or as permit buybacks (Beijing). CPFs 
that cover only the power sector have been conceived as top-up payments (GB, Netherlands) 
as an auction reserve price does not work straightforwardly without full sectoral coverage. 
 
3. Political economy analysis of a carbon price floor  
In this section, we begin by synthesizing the economic analysis on the choice between price 
and quantity instruments in climate policy; we then present a political-economy analysis of 
both an EU-wide and a national CPF in light of multiple market and policy failures. 
 
3.1. Economics of instrument choice: Prices vs quantities 
Without corrective policy measures, the market mechanism fails to deliver the efficient level 
of carbon emission because emitters are not charged for the external damages they cause. The 
appropriate economic instrument is a corrective charge on emissions which internalizes this 
cost, as recognized in the “Polluter Pays Principle”. If set at the right level, i.e., at the social 
cost of carbon (SCC), and with the right scope, i.e., for all emitters globally, such a carbon 
charge corrects the market failure. Over time, this carbon price would rise at the social 
discount rate, encouraging timely new investment in carbon abatement. 
A carbon price can be either delivered by capping the emissions quantity and then 
trading allowances, as in the EU ETS, or by fixing the emissions price through a carbon tax. 
In a stylized benchmark case with no uncertainty over abatement costs or benefits, these two 
instruments are equivalent: a particular price pins down a particular quantity (and vice versa). 
In a classic paper, Weitzman (1974) compared these two approaches in a simple setting 
where: (i) there is uncertainty about the ex post cost of emissions abatement, and (ii) in 
making their abatement decisions, firms have better cost information than the government. 
The government’s objective is to maximize welfare, that is, the difference between the 
benefits and costs of emissions abatement. The main insight is that setting a tax is superior to 
setting a quota if the marginal damage of emissions is flatter than the marginal abatement cost 
schedule. Hence our analysis points to the advantage of an instrument that fixes the carbon 
price: the marginal damage of CO2 now is essentially the same as that in 10 years’ time, given 
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the long resident times of CO2, even if the marginal damage steeply increases in the stock of 
emissions (Grubb & Newbery, 2008).15  
Figure 2 illustrates this analysis. At the time of the policy choice, the best estimate of 
the uncertain marginal abatement cost (MC) intersects the marginal damage (MB) at quota Q 
and tax t. The ex post correct marginal abatement cost intersects MB at Q* and t*. The 
deadweight loss of setting a quota (i.e., the extra cost of abating Q instead of Q*) is the large 
shaded triangle (“efficiency loss from quota”) while the deadweight loss of a tax is the shaded 
triangle (“efficiency loss from tax”) which is much smaller.  
 
 
Figure 2. Efficiency loss under uncertainty of a carbon tax relative to a carbon quota  
 
Previous studies have examined instrument choice in dynamic settings in which the 
environmental damage depends on the stock of pollutant, not the flow. Weitzman’s (1974) 
analysis assumes that uncertainty is resolved immediately after abatement choices, so applies 
directly only to flow pollutants (like noise). Pizer (2002) employed a modified DICE model 
(Nordhaus, 1994) and found a welfare gain from the optimal price five times larger than 
setting the optimal quota. Subsequent models (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Karp and Zhang, 2006; 
Karp and Zhang, 2012) address the role played by new information and learning; they also 
find that carbon taxes are welfare-superior to quotas, although taxes may be time-inconsistent 
and therefore subject to credibility issues. Slechten (2011) argues that investments should be 
front-loaded because learning-by-doing reduces subsequent abatement costs, although this is 
an argument for subsidizing such spill-overs, rather than relying solely on a carbon tax. 
                                                 
15 Conversely, fixing the quantity of emissions becomes preferable close to a “tipping point” at which 
climate damages escalate sharply. The aim to limit global temperature rises can be translated into a 
remaining carbon budget; for the Paris Agreement this leads to 395-455 billion tonnes of carbon, as 
suggested by Goodwin et al., 2018), which in turn can be translated into the point at which the 
marginal damage becomes very steep. See also Weitzman (2011) on the implications of “fat tailed” 
uncertainty for climate-policy design. 
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Similarly, the presence of risk aversion favours taxes over trading (Baldursson and von der 
Fehr, 2004). 
 A resolution of the apparent conflict between the objective of limiting the quantity of 
cumulative emissions and the argument above for a carbon price rather than quota on the rate 
of emissions is a hybrid scheme in which there is a carbon price floor, a quota and a ceiling 
(Roberts and Spence, 1976; Pizer, 2002; McKibben et al., 2009). Such a “price collar” avoids 
weaker-than-expected economic conditions leading to weakly binding (or even non-binding) 
constraints. It also avoids the carbon price reaching “too high” levels by giving polluters the 
option to buy permits at a fixed maximum price, and thus guards against excessive abatement 
costs—sometimes termed a “safety valve” (Pizer, 2002; Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Aldy et 
al. 2003). In the limit, where the ceiling and floor prices are set at the same level, the ETS 
with a price collar becomes equivalent to the carbon tax. 
  A hybrid price-quantity scheme can be seen as an approximation to a rising marginal 
damage curve (provided the price ceiling is set high enough). It better approximates the shape 
of the climate-damage function than an ETS or a tax can individually. A tax mimics a 
horizontal damage function (i.e., the damage done by an extra ton of emissions is constant) 
while a quota mimics a vertical damage function (i.e., exceeding a critical point leads to a 
sharp increase in damages). By contrast, a hybrid scheme can mimic a step-wise increasing 
marginal damage function—which is likely closer to the actual nature of climate damages. A 
carbon price floor is a simple hybrid design that, importantly, can be introduced within the 
existing EU ETS policy framework (rather than requiring a full transition to a carbon tax).16   
 In sum, this analysis suggests that there is a good case for the introduction of a price 
element—and a hybrid ETS design featuring a price floor is the preferred way to deliver this. 
 
3.2. Analysis of an EU-wide carbon price floor 
We now analyze an EU CPF that applies to the electricity sector across all Member States. 
This policy has the obvious appeal of eliminating the concern that cross-border trade within 
the Integrated Electricity Market (IEM) is distorted by unequal carbon prices.17  
 For electricity generation, a carbon price plays two distinct roles. In the short run, it 
affects emissions from existing plant; in the longer run, it guides the choice of plant to install 
and retire. The short-run impact raises more strongly the variable cost of plant with higher 
carbon intensities; hence it substitutes via the merit order from higher- to lower-carbon-
intensive plant, thus immediately reducing emissions as shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
16 Why then did the EU choose an ETS? It is politically simpler to introduce trading with many 
permits freely allocated to polluters than to impose a carbon tax (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz, 2013). 
Moreover, consumers often fail to recognise that free permits do not prevent price rises for carbon-
intensive goods—while CO2-emitting companies devote considerable resources to lobbying. 
17 Although cross-border electricity trade has increased dramatically in recent years, the vast majority 
of trading occurs within the confines of countries that fall within the EU ETS. Norway has (or will 
have) interconnectors to several EU Member States but has long been part of the EU ETS. Similarly, 
the Swiss ETS is now linked to the EU ETS. Any EU-wide agreement on a CPF would extend to 
Norway as well as Iceland and Liechtenstein as these non-Member States essentially apply EU ETS 
legislation under EEA rules. The Swiss ETS is linked to the EU ETS so coordination with an EU CPF 
would likely require consultation on the appropriate ETS design adjustments.   
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A direct argument for an EU CPF is then simply that the EU ETS has not delivered an 
adequate carbon price on which to justify investment in the durable capital-intensive low-
carbon generation needed to meet the EU’s decarbonisation targets. The EUA price has 
fluctuated within a band of €5–10/tCO2 from 2011-2017, well below estimates of the social 
cost of carbon (SCC) and “target-consistent” carbon prices. Moreover, as there is virtually no 
forward-trading liquidity beyond a three-year horizon, longer-run carbon prices remain a 
“missing market”. In the short run, the main implication within the electricity sector is too 
little fuel switching from coal- to gas-fired generation; in the longer run, it is too little 
investment in low-carbon technologies. An EU CPF can support investment by guaranteeing a 
minimum return on the emissions reductions achieved. Indeed, results from model 
simulations confirm that a CPF can raise low-carbon investment in the electricity sector—and 
help bring it forward in time (Brauneis, Mestel and Palan, 2013). 
More broadly, a market failure that distorts investments in electricity generation is a 
lack of sufficiently distant futures markets for fuel, electricity, as well as carbon. These 
missing markets tend to raise the cost of capital, thus favouring less capital-intensive 
investment over the higher capital costs of low-carbon technologies. Yet a private investment 
in durable assets needs confidence that future prices will be adequate for a sufficient fraction 
of the lifetime of a generation investment. Long-term contracts can correct for some absent 
future markets; similarly, a CPF with an appropriate floor trajectory can reduce perceived risk 
and enhance confidence.  
The impact of a longer-term EU CPF that raises the effective cost of carbon for the 
electricity sector is then: (1) fuel switching from coal to more gas and renewables, (2) 
increases in the wholesale electricity price (when fossil fuels are price-setting), countering the 
price-depressing effect of mandated renewables investment via the merit order effect, (3) 
stronger incentives for low-carbon generation and innovation, with less other financial 
support needed, (4) lower carbon emissions from the EU power sector, (5) additional tax 
revenue (at least until the EUA price reaches the CPF), (6) abatement cost inefficiency due to 
unequal carbon prices in the EU electricity sectors relative to other emissions-intensive 
industries subject to the EU ETS. 
 The design of such an EU-wide CPF needs to specify its level, rate of increase and 
duration. As the intention is to help decarbonise electricity and guide low-carbon investment, 
it should be high enough to discourage base or mid-merit operation of existing coal and 
lignite stations—and that will depend on the relative prices of coal and natural gas (Newbery, 
2016). At 2017 gas and coal prices, a carbon levy to “top up” the EUA price to an initial level 
of €25–30/tCO2 is probably adequate to yield significant coal-to-gas switching.18 This price 
floor could then rise at 3–5% annually above the rate of inflation to converge on the desired 
medium-run level. This is in line with international CPF experience and with the notion that 
the carbon price should rise, at a minimum, at the social discount rate. Starting now, it would 
                                                 
18 This price for coal-to-gas switching is broadly in line with other recent estimates. National Grid 
(2016, Figure 9) shows the GB switching values between the prices of gas and coal for a carbon price 
of €25.9/tCO2; see also IEA (2017a, Box 1.3) for similar estimates. IEA (2017b, Box 11.3) notes that 
for Europe “a CO2 price in the range of $50-80 per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) by 2025 would expand the 
market opportunities for existing gas-fired power plants”. In general, the carbon price needed to 
induce coal-to-gas switching is sensitive to the level of coal and gas prices (Newbery, 2018). 
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yield a CPF, in real terms, of around €30–40/tCO2 by 2025 and €35–55/tCO2 by 2030. Even if 
natural gas prices were to rise again, a commitment to this rate of increase until 2030 would 
likely encourage LEPs to plan on replacing their coal stations with lower-carbon alternatives. 
This CPF design is consistent with a proximate objective of addressing the future of 
coal in the power sector. It is also more practical than any linkage to estimates of the “social 
cost of carbon” (SCC) as these vary widely, e.g., due to disagreement about the appropriate 
discount rate and uncertainty around the timing of future climate damages. It is also broadly 
in line with the “target-consistent” carbon prices that are needed to deliver the EU’s climate 
targets; estimates of these range from €25–63/tCO2 for 2030 and €49–190/tCO2 by 2040 
(European Commission, 2011, Table 8, at 2008 prices).  
The power-only CPF yields carbon prices that are differentiated across sectors, with a 
non-traded sector (electricity) facing a higher carbon price than traded sectors (such as steel) 
within the EU ETS. While this sacrifices some abatement-cost efficiency, it can still be a good 
policy design in a world in which (a) other non-EU countries pursue only weak climate 
policies, and (b) trade policy does not correct for international differences in carbon prices via 
tariff adjustments (Hoel, 1996), i.e., carbon leakage remains an issue. This argument helps 
justify a higher power-specific EU carbon price, at least for the foreseeable future.19 
Such an EU-wide CPF should from 2019 also be compatible with the EU ETS’s new 
Market Stability Reserve. The CPF simply guarantees a minimum carbon price, regardless of 
how effective the MSR turns out to be. If the MSR raises the EUA price by more than 
anticipated, the CPF for the power sector may simply become non-binding—at least for a 
period of time. However, in addition, an EU CPF would also help anchor carbon price 
expectations for the power sector beyond 2030.20 
The remaining issue, then, is the impact of this EU power sector CPF on overall EU-
wide carbon emissions. Consider the benchmark in which the EU ETS cap is fixed and 
binding. Then the waterbed effect is complete: the reduction in EU power sector emissions 
releases EUAs from Large Electricity Producers (LEPs), lowers the carbon price until other 
sectors within the EU ETS buy them—and thus creates a countervailing increase in emissions 
from these other sectors. (Put differently, the intra-EU rate of carbon leakage here is 100%.) 
Hence, to achieve the desired climate benefit, at least in the short term, the EU CPF needs to 
go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the EU ETS cap or a mechanism for cancelling the 
additional allowances released.21 
                                                 
19 To some extent, this sectoral differentiation of the carbon price already exists in the EU ETS 
because: (1) firms in trade-exposed sectors receive higher free permit allocations than electricity 
generators, and (2) free permit allocations are now partly linked to a firm’s output. The output-based 
allocation effectively waters down the marginal carbon price faced by trade-exposed firms. 
Performance standards typically lead to quite diverse shadow carbon prices. 
20 If applied to all sectors covered by the EU ETS, an EU-wide CPF could, in principle, replace the 
MSR as a way of ensuring sufficient “tightness” of the EUA market. This would yield a simpler and 
more direct mechanism to support long-run low-carbon investment. Indeed, other industries such as 
cement or steel face a comparable problem to the power sector of having to make investment decisions 
in long-lived capital-intensive assets. 
21 Past climate-related policies have arguably failed to recognize this point. For example, the EU 
Renewables Directive may have had no impact on total emissions, given that the predictable reduction 
in LEP emissions was not offset by a corresponding reduction in the carbon cap. 
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A key point is that the new MSR design will partially and temporarily alleviate this 
waterbed effect. The CPF-induced reduction in EU power sector emissions creates additional 
surplus EUAs. From 2019, annually 24% of surplus EUAs move into the MSR (dropping to 
12% per year from 2024). From 2023 onwards, the MSR then begins cancelling its EUAs. In 
the medium term, this cancellation reduces the waterbed effect of “sub-ETS” action—such as 
a sectoral CPF—by an estimated 50–80% (Perino, 2018). Over the longer term, approaching 
2030, however, the waterbed is expected to fully re-emerge unless further EUA cancellations 
are agreed. 
To illustrate, suppose that the EU CPF in 2019 creates 100 additional surplus EUAs. 
Of these, 24 are placed into the MSR for later cancellation. However, in 2020, 24% of the 
remaining 76 EUAs, that is, a further 18.24 EUAs move into the MSR. After 4 years, almost 
67% of the original 100 extra EUAs are in the MSR and likely to subsequently be cancelled; 
thereafter 12% are transferred annually, so that 84% of the original emissions cut should be 
cancelled by 2030. Put differently, the waterbed effect is only 16% for a near-term emissions 
cut. In short, the new MSR means that an EU CPF for the power sector creates a substantial 
climate benefit.  
Preferably, the EU CPF would be designed in a way that fully offsets the waterbed 
effect by making the required adjustments to the ETS cap over its trajectory. Ideally, the EU 
would issue a Directive that binds all Member States to an agreed price floor trajectory or 
incorporates an EU-wide CPF into a further EU ETS reform package. Perhaps European 
regulatory and coordinating bodies, such as ACER, CEER and ENTSO-E, can agree on the 
need to decarbonise LEPs using a CPF.22 
In sum, an EU CPF can fill the “missing market” of longer-term carbon prices and 
bring forward low-carbon investment; it is a “low regret” policy that directly addresses the 
risk of a “too low” carbon price and remains valuable even if other reforms gain pace. 
 
3.3. Analysis of a national carbon price floor  
Individual EU countries are free to introduce a national CPF to signal their dissatisfaction 
with the EU ETS—to achieve a higher domestic carbon price and provide greater investor 
certainty. Since this also raises additional government revenue during a period of fiscal 
stringency, it offers a model that some countries might find doubly agreeable (even if the 
underlying tax base will shrink over time), particularly if it leads to the cancellation of a high 
fraction of the surplus EUAs. It is perhaps no coincidence that a national CPF has been 
adopted by countries with serious longer-term climate targets: the UK commitment to 80% 
reduction by 2050 through its Climate Change Act and independently-set carbon budgets and 
the Netherlands adopting a firm 49% target by 2030.   
 Over the longer run, even within a single country, there is a good case for signalling 
future carbon prices with sufficient credibility to avoid costly lock-in to what are likely to be 
                                                 
22 It is also worth bearing in mind the potential for unintended consequences in the interaction between 
multiple policy instruments (Bennear and Stavins, 2007). For example, an EU CPF would likely bring 
windfalls to some existing low-carbon support schemes designed to address an inadequate EUA 
price—which, in turn, might undermine its political support. However, this seems less of a problem 
with renewable support schemes that fix the price at which they can sell, such as the widely adopted 
feed-in tariffs and contracts-for-difference (CfDs). 
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unsustainable technologies. An ambition to cut GHGs by 80% by 2050 requires an almost 
complete decarbonisation of the electricity sector, and the generation to achieve this must be 
installed from now on and needs to deliver low-carbon LEPs rapidly. Figure 3 shows how, 
under its Two Degrees Scenario, National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios see the UK’s 
carbon intensity falling to 50gm/kWh by 2030, with no new coal plant built and renewables 
replacing gas. The picture is similar for other European countries but delivering on climate 
targets requires carbon prices many times higher than pre-2018 EUA prices. This creates a 
need to otherwise signal that all new generating investment (except perhaps for peaking plant 
running only a few hours per year) must be low or zero carbon. 
 
Figure 3. Historical and projected fuel mix in UK electricity generation under “Two Degrees” 
scenario  
Source: National Grid (2017), Future Energy Scenarios 
  
 The justification for a national CPF is that it is politically more feasible, in the short 
term, than a wider European CPF. Indeed, the political economy of an EU CPF is enormously 
challenging: Agreement on EU ETS reform has been so difficult because preferences for 
stringent carbon policy vary widely across Member States. For that same reason, reaching 
agreement on a Climate Action Regulation (also known as the Effort Sharing Regulation) to 
divide up the EU’s 2030 commitment to a 40% reduction overall has been so slow (Erbach, 
2018). In short, the trade-off between a CPF and an EU-wide policy is higher feasibility at the 
expense of greater intra-EU trade distortions. 
We suggest that the design of a national CPF takes a similar form to the EU-wide CPF 
above: a carbon levy to “top up” the EUA price to an initial level of €25–30/tCO2, rising at 3–
5% annually above inflation, at least up to 2030. In practice, there may be some modest 
variation to this guideline on the carbon price trajectory depending on the particular country 
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in question, for example, due to the particular characteristics of its fossil fuel generation assets 
(e.g., the relative efficiency and capacity levels of coal and gas plant). 
The domestic impacts of such a national CPF on the power sector are likely to be 
similar to those of an EU CPF: (1) fuel switching from coal to more gas and renewables, (2) 
increases in the wholesale electricity price; (3) stronger incentives for low-carbon generation, 
with less financial support needed, (4) lower carbon emissions from the power sector, (5) 
additional tax revenue. Any national climate policy faces additional challenges: as noted by 
Fankhauser, Hepburn and Park (2010), the ‘stacking’ of multiple national carbon policies 
alongside a multi-country ETS leads to greater abatement cost inefficiencies.23 In particular, a 
(binding) national CPF will typically mean that: (a) its electricity generators now face a 
different carbon price from the power sector elsewhere in the EU, and (b) its share of the EU 
power sector faces a different carbon price than emissions-intensive industries across the EU 
other than electricity (as previously with an EU-wide CPF). The magnitude of these knock-on 
effects now also depends on the degree of interconnectedness of the particular country with 
the rest of the EU (and on whether its neighbours also have a similar national CPF or a border 
tax adjustment on electricity imports from non-CPF jurisdictions is put in place). 
As Edenhofer et al. (2017) note, ‘[w]ithout compensatory measures, voluntary 
unilateral emission reductions within Member States (e.g. UK carbon price support, potential 
German coal power exit) dampen short-term allowance prices and shift emissions in space 
and time’ since they argue that the ‘EU ETS has so far not allowed the effective expression of 
different climate policy preferences across EU Member States’. This point is recognized in 
the 2017-21 Dutch Coalition Agreement; in pointing out the weakness of the EU ETS, it 
argues that “the group of leading countries will need to introduce supplementary policy, for 
instance on buying up ETS emission allowances.”24  
 A national CPF for the power sector would lead to a similar waterbed effect to the EU 
CPF discussed above. For the benchmark case with a fixed and binding ETS cap, the 
waterbed is 100%.25 Under the new MSR, it is expected to be substantially alleviated by 
around 50–80% in the medium term (but could re-emerge beyond 2030). Thus crucially, the 
MSR also enhances the value of a national CPF.26 The UK’s Committee on Climate Change 
similarly now considers individual Member State actions that reduce domestic emissions to 
also have additionality in terms of EU emissions (CCC, 2017, p. 21). 
                                                 
23 This benchmark result assumes that the ETS cap remains fixed as additional policy instruments are 
introduced, contrary to the spirit of the MSR; it also does not incorporate other market or policy 
failures beyond the climate externality. 
24 From the abridged English version of the coalition agreement, which can be found at: 
http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/coal/coalition-agreement--confidence-in-the-future-.pdf. The 
full Dutch version can be found at VVD et al (2017).   
25 If the ETS is fixed but not binding at a particular point in time, then a national emissions reduction 
may lead to a contemporaneous reduction in EU emissions (see also MacDonald, 2016); however, 
because of emissions banking it is likely that this is offset by higher EU emissions at a later date. The 
contemporaneous waterbed effect is weakened but over time it could reappear. 
26 Note that this holds even retroactively to unilateral policies enacted in the past; for example, any 
incremental EUA surplus created by the GB CPF may now work through the MSR and thus end up 
undoing some of the waterbed effect which this policy likely created during EU ETS Phase 3. 
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 Ideally a national CPF should fully offset the waterbed effect—and aim to have a 
neutral impact on the EUA price. As recognized in the Dutch policy, this can be achieved by 
way of additional cancellation of national allowances; indeed, such a supplementary policy is 
explicitly allowed under the latest EU ETS reforms. The Government would first have to 
estimate the number of EUAs reduced by the domestic CPF.27 Two complications now arise. 
The first is that the fraction of any emissions reduction that will be cancelled by the MSR 
varies over time and is uncertain when the national CPF is introduced. The second is that any 
national EUA cancellation works through the MSR in reverse: it reduces the number of 
surplus EUAs so that some EUAs that would otherwise have been cancelled by the MSR no 
longer are, in fact, cancelled. Nonetheless, national allowance cancellation—reviewed over 
time—could be desirable from a climate perspective (even if ensuring full EU-wide 
cancellation through an extended MSR would be far more individually incentive-compatible). 
A lesson from the British experience with a national CPF is that it may suffer from the 
problems of credibility of any fiscal instrument introduced by a single country. While the 
original intention was for the CPF to rise very strongly over time (to £70/tCO2 by 2030), this 
was never enshrined in law—in contrast to the 5 year carbon budgets. The price trajectory 
was then halted just as it began to rise, without any commitment to maintaining the CPF 
beyond 2020/21. Binding price floor targets for 2020 and 2030 could have provided credible 
medium- and longer-term commitment, and these could have largely superseded the need for 
any other signals, at least in the electricity sector. A carbon price that can be changed each 
year lacks credibility; reputation can deliver credibility but takes time to build. 
Given this lack of credibility, the British CPF was supplemented from the outset, in 
the 2013 Energy Act, by an emissions performance standard (EPS) that ruled out new coal 
generation. To replace the existing coal, the Act set up annual auctions for long-term capacity 
payment contracts for new flexible fossil generation (HC, 2013). The UK continued to 
maintain (and even expand) a diverse arsenal of shorter-term climate policy instruments, 
many of which were directed to other market failures or behavioural biases. Subsequently, the 
UK Government announced that coal generation would be phased out by 2025 (BEIS, 2018), 
since updated to 2023.  
Will unilateral CPFs within the EU support movement towards an EU-wide CPF or 
will they undermine it? Governments imposing a national CPF that raises carbon costs 
significantly above the ETS price may fear that their competitive position is put at risk—
unless other countries follow with comparable CPFs under EU direction. Since the French 
CPF proposal in 2016, NGOs have increasingly embraced the idea of “regional carbon price 
floors” and pressured for greater government action (Tamma, 2017). Thus, a gradual stitching 
together of unilateral CPFs from the UK and the Netherlands to other Member States that 
might be so inclined (such as France or the Nordic countries) provides at least a plausible 
alternative dynamic that makes an EU-wide CPF more likely over time—without requiring 
                                                 
27 The induced emissions reduction can be estimated by using a dispatch model to calculate carbon 
emissions with and without the CPF; for example, the Single Electricity Market Committee of the Irish 
electricity market uses Plexos for similar modelling exercises.  
 20 
the need for consensus and giving veto power to those least inclined towards aggressive 
climate action.28  
In sum, a national CPF has the advantage of greater feasibility over an EU-wide CPF 
but also comes with greater intra-EU trade distortions. Countries with stringent domestic 
emissions targets may find a national CPF particularly attractive to avoid getting locked into 
unsustainable technologies and they might further enhance the credibility of their CPF by 
supplementing it with an EPS.  
 
4. Broader interactions with other climate-related policies 
 
Coal phase-out and emissions performance standards 
In several jurisdictions, addressing the future of coal has been a key motivation for a CPF. 
Interest in shifting from coal has continued to accelerate; the UK and Canada were pivotal in 
recently setting up the Powering Past Coal consortium, that now includes over twenty 
countries,29 including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK and as well as various sub-
national jurisdictions (Chestney et al, 2017). Once coal has been eliminated from the 
generation mix, the question is whether the lack of that rationale could deprive a CPF of its 
political legitimacy—even if it will still continue to encourage zero-carbon generation over 
natural gas. 
 Like Britain, jurisdictions can set an EPS which, together with the CPF, effectively 
requires elimination of coal or the use of CCS to reduce the overall emissions intensity. Two 
cases where an EPS has been used in isolation (without a CPF) are in North America. In 
Canada, the federal EPS of 420 tons/GWh was implemented in 2015; although the first 
commercial-scale CCS plant at Boundary Dam was not mandated by it, any subsequent coal 
plants need to have at least some CO2 capture to meet the standard (Gale, 2015). In the US, 
the Obama Administration adopted two main regulatory approaches to address the role of coal 
in the electricity mix: new source performance standards under Section 111(d) of the Clean 
Air Act and a Clean Power Plan for existing sources under Section 111(b) (Perlis, 2014). Any 
new or “substantially modified” coal plant would be required to deploy CCS to stay below the 
EPS. By contrast, the Clean Power Plan set state-level targets for CO2 emissions intensity 
which could be achieved flexibly.30 
                                                 
28 Woo et al. (2017) note that California requires out-of-state generators be certified if they are to be 
counted as “specified” sources subject to unit-specific GHG emissions factors. Washington State 
therefore exports hydro power to gain higher California prices but locally generates “replacement” 
power from the same kinds of gas generation which it displaces in California. This might prompt 
Washington State, faced with increased local emissions, to adopt a similar policy, in which case the 
short-run distortion might lead to a better outcome over the longer haul. 
29 The current membership list is at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-international-
action/coal-phase-out/alliance-declaration.html   
30 States could use a default rate-based standard or an equivalent “mass-based” regulation (such as 
cap-and-trade) which could be coordinated with other states (Burtraw et al., 2014a). Bushnell et al. 
(2015) anticipated an average price on the order of $35/tCO2 in a resulting cap-and-trade system, in 
line with the SCC used by the Environmental Protection Agency in designing the Clean Power Plan. 
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Low-carbon innovation policy 
The EU has several mechanisms explicitly linked to the EUA price to support low-carbon 
technologies. These funds may motivate others to support a CPF beyond those interested 
purely in emissions reductions. For example, the NER300 mechanism had set aside 300 
million allowances to support CCS, innovative renewables technologies, and advanced 
biofuels. When its first call for proposals was launched in November 2010, the EUA price 
was over €15/tCO2 and so the fund was expected to raise close to €5 billion; instead the 
auctions came in 2013, by which time EUA prices were closer to €7/tCO2, and so raised 
almost 60% less than originally expected (van Noorden, 2013; Reiner, 2016). The NER300 
allocated project funds to 24 of 28 Member States, thus ensuring that there was widespread 
benefit from the programme (Åhman et al, 2018). Its successor, the Innovation Fund, will set 
aside 450 million EUAs for auctioning to support low-carbon technologies, and the 
‘modernisation fund’ supports energy efficiency in poorer EU countries by auctioning off 2% 
of total allowances. Revenue from an EU CPF could be a better, more stable source of 
funding innovation as linking revenue to the price of EUAs means that revenue falls just 
when the funds are most needed. In contrast, money raised from a CPF rises when needed and 
falls when less critical. Both funds can help create constituencies to support a broad CPF, 
including in poorer EU Member States otherwise less inclined towards stronger climate 
policy. 
 
EU ETS linking to other cap-and-trade systems 
Countries need to consider whether a CPF affects plans to link to another ETS. Parry (2017) 
argues that there is the potential for coordinated carbon price floor arrangements under Article 
6.2 of the Paris Agreement. A carbon price ceiling, by effectively eliminating a hard cap on 
emissions, may complicate linking cap-and-trade systems under Article 6. In the WCI, 
Quebec and Ontario have, by linking adopted California’s CPF. New Zealand did not adopt a 
price floor and plans to modify its price ceiling in order to be compatible with future linking; 
Australia had planned to remove its CPF to avoid incompatibility with the EU ETS. The issue 
is perhaps not so much whether a CPF is compatible with the EU ETS but that linking 
involves decisions on alignment—and the larger ETS can have considerable bargaining power 
along a number of dimensions including a CPF. However, the UK experience suggests that a 
national CPF can be adopted without any rebuke from other EU ETS countries.  
 
Brexit 
A question mark looming over European carbon markets is the future role of Britain. A “hard 
Brexit” in which the UK drops out of the single electricity market and the EU ETS (and 
perhaps even out of coordinating bodies such as ENTSO-E and ACER) could be problematic. 
There have been moves in the European Parliament to guard against British EUAs flooding 
the market if it decided to abruptly leave the ETS, although the MSR should mitigate most if 
not all of these adverse effects. After some initial threats of unilateral action (Brunsden and 
Barker, 2017) a short-term arrangement was reached between UK and EU-27 negotiators—
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although it is still unclear if the UK will remain within the EU ETS after the end of the third 
phase in 2020 (Krukowska et al, 2017).  
 The UK has seen the majority of interconnectors built or commencing construction in 
the last five years, so interconnectors themselves will not be affected under Brexit (Pollitt and 
Chyong, 2017). Yet if the French proposal for an EU-wide CPF of, say, €30/tCO2 was 
instituted in 2022, this could create an inefficient asymmetric carbon price at either end of the 
Anglo-French interconnection—unless the GB CPF aligned itself with the EU-ex-UK CPF. 
The UK Climate Change Act’s trajectory with an 80% reduction target by 2050, supported by 
five-year carbon budgets determined by the Committee on Climate Change, should prevent 
the UK from easing its climate ambitions—even following a hard Brexit. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The EU ETS has so far produced an insufficient price signal to adequately incentivize low-
carbon power generation. Recently agreed EU ETS reforms still leave the risk of a too low 
short-term carbon price and the “missing market” of a longer-term carbon price. This slow 
progress has led to the UK and the Netherlands opting for a national power sector CPF. 
Others, notably France, have instead emphasised the need for an EU-wide price floor. At the 
same time, the European Commission and leading Member States such as Germany have, 
officially at least, continued to describe the EU ETS as the central instrument of climate 
action. 
 We have argued that an EU-wide CPF for the power sector would constitute a 
significant improvement to the EU ETS. It would help re-affirm the EU’s position as a 
climate leader and contribute to achieving decarbonisation targets. This CPF is a “low regret” 
policy: it directly addresses the risk of a too low carbon price and can help reassure investors 
whether or not other reforms gain pace. Combining it with a carbon price ceiling—to create a 
price corridor—might also make the policy more attractive to countries concerned about 
volatile carbon market prices. 
 We have further argued that individual Member States with more ambitious climate 
objectives may find a national power sector CPF an attractive and readily-feasible policy to 
signal low-carbon investment and getting locked into unsustainable technologies. This, in 
turn, could create a policy dynamic leading to a regional CPF in North-West Europe or to a 
redoubling of efforts to institute an EU CPF to avoid proliferation of national CPFs. 
Our CPF design recommendation is based on inducing coal-to-gas switching, as a 
carbon levy to top up the EUA price to €25–30/tCO2, rising at 3–5% annually above inflation 
at least up to 2030. The EU ETS’s new Market Stability Reserve will, in the medium term to 
the mid-2020s, substantially alleviate the “waterbed effect” associated with such additional 
policies—at the national or sectoral level—that operate within the EU ETS’s coverage. Its 
novel mechanism to cancel EUAs creates a climate benefit—and thus further enhances the 
value of a CPF. 
In sum, a well-designed power sector CPF is increasingly attractive on both political-
economy and environmental grounds.  
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